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The concept of modularity is used to 
express the division of the computational 
resources of the mind into several mental 
expertise systems. This idea gained major 
importance within the emerging ﬁ  eld of 
social neuroscience (Cacioppo et al., 2000), 
as it brought together three lines of stud-
ies that up to that point were not so easily 
combined: studies on the neurobiological 
correlates of complex traits, studies on the 
evolutionary basis of these correlates, and 
studies on social behavior (for a classical 
example: Fiddick et al., 2000).
By establishing the importance of a 
limited number of principles inherent to 
the brain, this concept of modularity rep-
resents a reaction to the relativist tradition 
that dominated studies of social phenomena 
during twentieth century, which strongly 
emphasized cross-cultural differences in 
social behavior and its irreducibility to 
biological frameworks (for a discussion: 
Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994). Conversely, 
the perspective that group cohesion relies on 
speciﬁ  c, semi-automatic types of cognition, 
which embody unique responses to selective 
pressures that lead to the differentiation of 
brain circuits specialized for those demands 
(Cosmides, 1989) greatly expands the ﬁ  eld 
of cognitive sciences, and that is one of the 
main reasons why it became so prominent.
Among the social cognitive processes 
that deﬁ  ne this expertise system, the most 
prominent are Theory-of-Mind (Baron-
Cohen, 1997), sensitivity to fairness 
(Barkow et  al., 1992), and in-group/out-
group   differentiation (Ohman, 2005). It 
is reasonable to assume that sensitivity to 
fairness and in-group/out-group differenti-
ation are especially related: not only do they 
exert highly complementary functions, but 
they also represent complementary types of 
modular learning, related to the propensity 
to generate long-lasting reactions to unfair 
in-group members and to out-group mem-
bers paired with aversive stimuli.
One of the most prominent  experiments 
on in-group/out-group differentiation 
  demonstrated that members of a racial 
group other than one’s own were more 
readily and lastingly associated to aversive 
stimuli in the classic conditioning paradigm 
(Olsson et al., 2005). The authors hypoth-
esized that this trend was related to an evo-
lutionary predisposition to fear out-group 
members, in accordance with the argument 
that race bias activates subcortical systems 
that are similar to the ones activated by 
fear learning.
In relation to fairness, one of the most 
prominent perspectives establishes that 
most people tend to reject low offers in the 
Ultimatum Game, despite the fact that this 
behavior stands against the maximization of 
their proﬁ  ts, whereas chimpanzees tend to 
be ‘rational maximizers’ (Jensen et al., 2007). 
This perspective is often related to ﬁ  ndings 
indicating the role of ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex in regulating utilitarian behavior 
in human subjects (Koenigs, et al., 2007), to 
the same extent that it is related to studies 
arguing that source memory of the faces of 
cheaters (Mealey et al., 1996; Buchner et al., 
2009) and unfair participants is enhanced 
(Oda, 1997).
However, two very recent studies con-
test the conclusion that these ﬁ  ndings lead 
to the endorsement of a social expertise 
system. In the ﬁ  rst one, Tiago Maia (2009) 
revealed that the superior out-group con-
ditioning effects that were found in the race 
experiment could be explained solely based 
on the perspectives that lower exposure to 
members of the other race led to increased 
learning rates and that prior exposure to 
members of the other race was different for 
whites and blacks. He reached this conclu-
sion by applying a statistical method (the 
Kalman Filter), commonly used to analyze 
phenomena that change continuously over 
time, to a computational simulation of the 
experiment that included all its parameters 
and found that the participants of both races 
behaved in the way expected under a norma-
tive statistical model of learning that did not 
include any weight to a priori/ evolutionary 
  preparedness to fear out-group members. 
According to the author, this analysis 
explains a subtle and yet important feature 
of the original American experiment: out-
group conditioning was slightly higher for 
whites than for blacks, due to the fact that 
blacks have a mean exposure to whites that 
is higher than the opposite.
In the second and more remarkable 
study, Chang and Sanfey (2009) revealed 
that the amount of money offered in the 
Ultimatum Game did not correlate to 
the chances of being remembered by an 
  opponent, after several game sessions with 
different subjects, as would be expected 
if there was an evolutionary tendency to 
remember coparticipants, based on their 
fairness. On the contrary, the authors found 
that selective memory for faces was actually 
correlated with the intensity to which an 
opponent violated the subject’s expecta-
tions in any direction. Making an analogy 
with Maia’s experiment, one would say that 
it is not necessary to attribute differential 
weights to the different types of outcomes of 
the social interaction (fair/unfair) in order 
to model the way that the participants of 
this experiment remember the ones with 
whom they interacted, since the learning 
rates are solely deﬁ  ned by expectation. This 
experiment also involved neuroimaging, 
which led the authors to add that there is 
no particular neural signature for either fair 
or unfair partners encountered previously 
(Chang and Sanfey, 2009; p. 12), therefore 
extending the social cognitive ﬁ  ndings to 
the neurobiological bedrock.
Together these experiments inspire a note 
of caution in regard to radically modular 
views of human social cognition, as they 
expose some potential weaknesses at the 
heart of the concept of social expertise and 
its use to explain complex behavioral ﬁ  nd-
ings. It is not the case to say that they deny the 
existence of a social brain module (clearly, 
this denial is not pursued by the authors), but 
it remains a fact that they present evidence 
that the interaction between cross-domain Dias  Modularity of social cognition
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  faculties and expertise cognition might 
not be as simple as it was once conceived. 
Speciﬁ  cally, this could mean that the per-
spective that specialized systems would 
‘pre-empt’ more general ones (Fiddick et al., 
2000) might be challenged by more complex 
statistical arrangements, in which less spe-
cialized principles received more attention.
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